The Historical Background of the Post-War Confiscation of Property of German Nationals in Czechoslovakia
grouped together with 'traitors and enemies of the Republic'. An exception was made only for persons who had actively fought for the freedom of the Czech and Slovak people and for those who had been persecuted by the Nazis on account of their race or political opinion. Further, by a Presidential Decree of 2 August 1945, Czechoslovak citizens of German nationality -apart from a few stated exceptions -were deprived of their citizenship. For the Germans of the Sudetenland, this took effect retroactively as from 10 October 1938, the date on which they had been granted German citizenship under the law on the 'reunification' of Sudeten territory with the Reich. 2 These measures were elements of a complex scheme for the compulsory transfer of the German-speaking population out of Czechoslovakia, a scheme sanctioned in the final Declaration of the Potsdam Conference of 2 August 1945. There is extensive German documentation on the difficult conditions in which the transfer of about three million Sudeten Germans took place, and on episodes of violence including the killing of a large numbers of Sudeten Germans, facts which were tolerated by the Czechoslovak authorities.
3 However, the thesis put forward by some German writers 4 that a genocide was committed against the Sudeten Germans is untenable. Noting in particular the seizure of property belonging to persons of German origin, these writers perceived this to be an international crime, a classification which imposes a legal obligation on all states not to recognize any legal effect of those acts. 5 They reached such a conclusion by linking together the fact of the confiscations and the 6 E.g. Ermacora, supra note 1, at 178: 'Die Konfiskationsmassnahmen haben für sich selbst im vorliegendem Gesamtzusammenhang Völkermordcharakter'; and Blumenwitz, supra note 4, at 27: 'Vertreibung und Enteignung können als ein Akt gewertet werden. confiscations and the fact of the Vertreibung, both regarded as impermissible forms of collective punitive measures. 6 In reality, the confiscation of German assets also had other motives, such as agricultural reform and in particular obtaining reparations. Indeed, President Benes himself initially characterized the decrees on confiscation as instruments of reparation. It was only later, after the Inter-Allied Reparation Agency (IARA, of which Czechoslovakia was a member) had assumed its functions in 1946 that the Czechoslovak Government preferred to consider the confiscations as an internal sanction against persons regarded as 'disloyal' to the state, by which time Czechoslovakia had obtained reparations of only US$190,000. 7 Various reasons can be found to explain this change in perspective. First and foremost, the growing divergence between the positions of the Western states and the central and eastern European states under Soviet protection, concerning the policy to be followed over German reparations, made it seem improbable as early as 1946 that a peace treaty or general arrangement on the matter of German reparations would be reached quickly. Hence there was a tendency for states parties to the Paris Agreement of 14 January 1946 establishing the IARA to keep the entire proceeds of confiscations of German assets on their own territories for themselves by way of advance payment, thus bypassing IARA's quotas. Since Czechoslovakia was one of the countries with the highest concentration of German assets, its reluctance to classify the confiscations of German property already effected as reparations can be easily understood; such a step might have led to the determination that Czechoslovakia had already exceeded its quota of reparations, equal to 3 per cent, on the basis of the Paris Agreement.
The difficulty of bringing the Czechoslovak confiscation measures within the ambit of reparations was also exacerbated by the fact that the Czechoslovak Government waited until 1973 before calculating the sum total of damages sustained as a result of the events of 1938-1945, although it is conceded that is difficult to establish a precise figure for the damage caused to Czechoslovakia as a consequence of its dismemberment by Nazi Germany before the start of the war. Bohemia and Moravia became almost a German colony, with the resulting ruthless exploitation of all economic resources and the deprivation of the Czech people of their fundamental civil rights, damage which is practically impossible to measure. Whatever the case may be, on 11 December 1973, on the occasion of the signing of the Treaty of Prague on the normalization of relations between Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany, 8 the Czechoslovak Government advanced claims for approximately 9 German text reproduced in Bundesgesetzblatt 1992, II, 462.
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On the Declaration, see Blumenwitz, 'Die deutsch-tschechische Erklärung vom 21 Januar 1997', 38 Archiv des Völkerrechts (1998) 19. The German text is reproduced at ibid., at 67.
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Blumenwitz, ibid., at 31, criticizes that the German noun Unrecht is given in Czech as krivda which is the general noun for 'injustice', and not as the more specific noun bezpravi, which specifically means 'wrongful act'. This criticism is specious, given the fact that in German too the term Unrecht could express either moral or legal disapproval.
314,000 million Czech crowns, and such a claim was also intended as a rebuttal to the claims for damages made by Vertriebenen in Germany.
Although the various governments of the Federal Republic of Germany have never officially supported the claims of the Vertriebenen, the decision of the post-war Czechoslovak Governments not to characterize the confiscations of Sudeten Germans' property as reparations, and to deprive Sudeten Germans of their Czechoslovak citizenship with retroactive effect from October 1938, had the consequence that the Federal Republic of Germany could legitimately make a claim on behalf of its citizens for the alleged wrongful act committed by Czechoslovakia with the enactment of the Benes Decrees almost 60 years ago. Reciprocal claims for damages arising out of the war were pre-empted by the Treaty of Good Neighbourhood and Cooperation of 27 February 1992. 9 Neither were such claims settled on the occasion of the Joint Declaration of 21 January 1997, which the parties intended should reconcile the two countries. 10 The aim of the Declaration was the reciprocal remission of moral debts, and a symbolic recognition by both sides of their own wrongdoing. In Article II, the Federal Republic of Germany recognizes Germany's responsibility in the historical developments leading to the Munich Agreement of 30 September 1938 and from there to the destruction of the Republic of Czechoslovakia and finally to the flight and compulsory transfer of millions of persons of German ethnicity from the territory of Czechoslovakia. In Article III, the Czech Republic in turn expresses regret for the fact that, during the compulsory transfer, 'suffering and injustices' 11 were inflicted even on innocent people. Regret is expressed in particular for the excesses committed in violation of basic humanitarian principles and legal norms in force at the time, and which went unpunished by virtue of a law of amnesty passed in 1946. In Article IV, the two parties declare that they agree to put aside political or legal questions deriving from past events, although each party remains bound by its own legal order and respects the fact that the other party has a different conception of the law.
This Declaration demonstrates the wish of the German federal government, if not to consider the issue closed once and for all, at least to commit itself not to make claims for itself or to lend support through diplomatic channels for claims made by its citizens. The Declaration, however, continues to be challenged by the Vertriebenen, who are supported in the highest ranks of the Bavarian governing party. As the Bavarian Prime Minister Stoiber himself affirmed at the time the Declaration received 12 Cf. Stoiber's declaration on 30 January 1997, reproduced in Archiv der Gegenwart (1997) 14 which the Federal Republic concluded with France, the United Kingdom and the United States regarding the regulation of questions arising from the war and the occupation of Germany. Under the Convention, the Federal Republic agreed not to raise any future objections to measures adopted with respect to German property located abroad for the purposes of reparation or restitution or as a result of the war, i.e. measures adopted unilaterally or pursuant to agreements between the three Allied Powers and other allied or neutral countries. The Federal Republic further bound itself to deny access to the courts for claims against those (including international organizations and foreign governments) who had acquired or transferred title to property on the basis of reparation measures.
In particular, the Court of Cologne rejected the applicant's argument that the measures envisaged by Article 3 of Part VI of the Settlement Convention concerned only 'German' property, and did not therefore include the property of a citizen (who was also Head of State) of a neutral country. The Court, citing previous decisions by the Court of Cassation, decided that, in the absence of a definition of 'German property abroad' in the Settlement Convention, the characterization of property as 'German' or otherwise is for the expropriating state to determine, and the German courts were not competent to judge the lawfulness or otherwise of expropriations carried out in another country. 15 The decision was confirmed on appeal on 19 July 1996, 16 and subsequently the Supreme Court refused to hear a further appeal, as the case did not raise issues of fundamental importance and had no prospect of success. On 28 January 1998, the Federal Constitutional Court 17 also rejected Prince Hans Adam II's constitutional claim under Article 93(1) and (4)(a) of the Grundgesetz, alleging a violation of Article 25 of the Constitution, which guarantees that the public bodies of the Federal Republic shall observe customary international law.
In the Federal Constitutional Court, the appellant claimed that the decisions of the lower courts hearing the case on its merits violated three generally recognized norms of international law: the first forbidding victors confiscating the property of neutral citizens; the second forbidding treaties imposing obligations on third parties; and the third providing that the citizenship of an individual shall be determined solely according to the law of the state which confers it. The Constitutional Court had no difficulty in unanimously rejecting these three grounds of complaint, stating that the three norms in question were irrelevant for the purposes of the decision of inadmissibility. As regards the first norm, the lower courts had taken no position on the lawfulness or otherwise of the Czech expropriation, and neither were they obliged 18 See the authors quoted in the previous note. On this question, see the seminal study by C. Dominice, La notion du caractère ennemi des biens privées dans la guerre sur terre (1961) . As Dominicè rightly points out, measures of economic warfare taken by the belligerents pendente bello are to be distinguished from measures specifically enacted as a means of reparation after the termination of the conflict. Whereas pendente bello international law allows the belligerents to utilize a wide concept of 'enemy property' in order to give maximum effect to their economic warfare, post bellum measures taken by the victorious powers must be confined, as a rule, to property belonging to the defeated state's subjects.
to do so according to international law. As regards the second norm, the prohibition of legal proceedings contained in Article 3(1) of Part VI of the Settlement Convention does not constitute an obligation imposed on third parties since it binds solely the Federal Republic and its courts, not Liechtenstein. With respect to the third norm, in applying the aforesaid Article 3(1) of Part VI of the Convention, the courts did not make an independent assessment as to the citizenship of the applicant's father. Rather, by means of a teleological interpretation, which was constitutionally unobjectionable, they had subsumed within the formula 'measures against German property abroad', measures which, in the intent of the actor state, were carried out against property belonging to persons of German nationality.
The reasoning behind the Constitutional Court's decision is well set out, and does not deserve the criticisms which have been levelled by authoritative German commentators. 18 In fact, as another commentator has perceptively pointed out, 19 the Constitutional Court could hardly have reached a different decision, since, even if we hypothesize that the lower courts had erred on some point or other, they had nonetheless violated no right or fundamental freedom of the Prince guaranteed by the German Constitution.
In the present author's opinion, however, the decisions of the lower courts do not contain the serious errors which some commentators have attributed to them. The crux of the Cologne Court's decision, which was followed by the superior courts, is the application of Article 3(1) and (3) of Part VI of the Settlement Convention. Once this provision has been identified as the applicable norm, the issue of whether the measures taken by the expropriating state conform to international law becomes irrelevant, precisely because the Federal Republic has agreed not to raise objections and not to allow recourse to domestic channels of justice.
It may well be that a norm of international law prohibits the victor from confiscating the property of neutral citizens, although this is far from certain given the widespread practice followed by various belligerents during both World Wars of including not only enemy property but also property in which enemy citizens had a predominant interest or which was destined for the enemy, or which belonged to individuals residing in enemy countries. 20 But, whatever the solution under international law, this does not affect the German courts, which must abstain from interfering with or determining claims regarding these matters.
In addition, it may well be the case that a norm of international law prevents a 21 It is noteworthy that the concept of 'ethnicity' is not peculiar to the Benes Decrees, but, on the contrary, are typical of the legal terminology of the successor countries to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which, for many purposes, differentiated between Staatsangehörigkeit and Nationalität or Volkszugehörigkeit. 27 the assumption on which Doehring bases his argument is highly debatable. He assumes that the confiscation of enemy private property is unlawful according to international law, and that, under the provisions of Article 5 of Part VI of the Settlement Convention, the Federal Republic, as the true debtor as regards reparations, had recognized the right of recourse in favour of individuals whose property has been expropriated for the debt paid by the individual on its behalf.
This interpretation of the norm, an interpretation put forward notably by Seidl-Hohenveldern and Ipsen in the 1960s, 28 is not, however, the only possible interpretation. A brief comparison with a similar provision in the Treaty of Versailles illustrates the issue. Article 297(b) of the Treaty of Versailles established that the Allied Powers reserved 'the right to retain and liquidate all the property and interests of German subjects or companies under their control in their territory, in their colonies, possessions and protectorates, including the territory ceded to them by virtue of the present Treaty', while Article 297(e) gave the Allied Powers the right to retain the sum recovered as a guarantee for the payment of compensation due to their citizens by Germany. Article 297(h) stated that any such sum should be accredited to Germany under the heading of reparations, and Article 297(i) imposed upon Germany the obligation to indemnify its own citizens for the loss of their property.
Commentators interpreted these provisions of the Treaty of Versailles in various ways. To justify the content of Article 297, some commentators stressed the victors' need to guarantee for themselves sources of reparation wherever possible, as well as considerations of a punitive nature. 29 Other commentators, by contrast, read Article 297 as confirmation of the continuing validity in international law, despite the contrary practice which grew up in the First World War, of a norm prohibiting the confiscation of enemy private property. They therefore criticized the provision in Article 297(b) of the Treaty of Versailles to retain and liquidate German property as tantamount to confiscation, since Germany was clearly unable to meet the obligations 30 This argument is somewhat specious. If the consent given by the defeated state were to be deemed an exoneration of the responsibility of the expropriating victor states, that would not explain the 'right' to compensation enjoyed by those suffering expropriation. If, on the other hand, the undertaking by the defeated state to compensate individuals suffering expropriation was to be considered equivalent to an assumption of debt, this would entail recognizing that the individuals in question held an internationally significant position as creditors vis-à-vis their own state, which would be in marked contrast to the then dominant theories of international law as regards an individual's standing under international law.
An objective examination of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles mentioned above, by contrast, leads to a different conclusion: it transpires that victor stateswhile, on the one hand regarding the confiscation of private property for reparation purposes as perfectly lawful, but, on the other hand, aware of the danger that private property might bear the brunt of reparations -had intended to set a 'protective' norm which safeguarded the interests of those whose property had been expropriated, by putting pressure on the defeated state to undertake to indemnify its citizens, thus spreading the burden over the whole community. In fact, this is the position taken by the Government of the Federal Republic vis-à-vis Article 5 of Part VI of the Settlement Convention. The government regards the damage as generally ascribable to the war, which therefore ought to be indemnified using the same criteria as adopted by the federal law on the sharing of the burden of war damages.
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In the case of the Prince of Liechtenstein's claim, the most frequent criticism levelled at the German courts' refusal to give an independent interpretation of the term 'German property abroad' is that the 'renouncement of sovereignty' (to use Doehring's expression), which Germany agreed to in the Settlement Convention, cannot be interpreted as meaning that Germany 'renounced the right to verify whether it had renounced'. 32 Yet again, though, the criticism is misplaced. Here we touch upon the core of the entire matter. What we are witnessing is a clear attempt by some German legal commentators to reinterpret There is a feeling of déjà vu about this doctrinal attack against Article 3 of Part VI of the Settlement Convention. After the war, German state bodies made every effort to find ways of limiting, as far as possible, the damage caused by the expropriation of German property abroad. A special agency, the Deutsches Auslandsvermögen, was set up within the Foreign Ministry for this purpose; and, over the years, the federal government has occasionally been successful in using diplomacy to alleviate the severity of confiscation measures. The government negotiated bilateral agreements which envisaged the restitution of part of the property or the proceeds of its liquidation in exchange for various German services, and persuaded some countries, including Turkey and various Latin American states, to return German property. 37 The German Supreme Court proved even more adept than the federal government at reducing the extent of the confiscations of German property abroad. At first, the Supreme Court declared that the laws of the foreign state should provide the criteria for identifying German property subject to confiscation. Within a short time, however, it took the opposite view, according to which the characterization of property as 'German' or otherwise should not be decided by applying the norms of the confiscating state, but by applying the norms of German private international law. The reason for this change of view 38 was that, at the time, German majority shareholders of companies incorporated abroad which held property in Germany were trying to avoid the effects of confiscation by incorporating new companies in Germany under German law and then transferring to the new company the property situated within Germany. Before receiving the backing of the Supreme Court, these so-called Spaltgesellschaften were supported in their legal soundness by, among others, Seidl-Hohenveldern. In a work on international confiscation and expropriation published in 1952, this eminent author maintained that, since the laws on the confiscation of German private property abroad were unlawful according to international law, 39 weak one and lends itself to numerous criticisms. As Serick 41 observed, the principle of territoriality may perhaps be the consequence of the non-recognition of the autonomy of a juristic person, but it can never be its cause. Other scholars of company law 42 pointed out that the Spaltungstheorie confused the fundamental distinctions between a non-stock corporation and a joint-stock company, and between the expropriation of the assets of a company and the expropriation of shareholders' rights. Admittedly, the courts of one state could refuse to recognize measures taken by the state (in which the company was incorporated) which confiscated the rights of shareholders, on the grounds of ordre public. But this 'public order' exception could not be used by German judges to oppose measures aimed at confiscating the rights of German shareholders in companies incorporated in other countries, since this is implicitly prevented by Article 3(1) and (2) of Part VI of the Settlement Convention. 
The Prince's Application to the European Court of Human Rights
After the Constitutional Court's judgment, the painting was returned to Brno. The matter should have ended there. But, on 28 July 1998, the Prince of Liechtenstein lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights against Germany. 44 He alleged a breach of Article 6(1) of the Convention, that is, a breach of the right of access to justice and of the right to a fair hearing, as well as a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of the recognition by the German courts of the As is well known, by virtue of Article 41 (ex Art. 50), the Court never orders a state to amend its law or to quash a judgment, yet where the law is the cause of the violation, the state may necessarily have to amend its law in order to comply with its obligations. Czechoslovak confiscation measures, and a breach of Article 14 of the Convention for discrimination with regard to damages. It is the first of these grounds of complaint, based on an alleged denial of justice, that deserves special attention.
Before considering the issue, however, it is appropriate to remark on the political significance of the case brought before the 46 To do so would open the way for a large number of claims to be brought in German courts. Some courts might admit claims for damages by the Vertriebenen against the states which confiscated their property (to Czechoslovakia one may add Poland and the Russian Federation), and would deny those states immunity from jurisdiction on the ground that the latter's acts could be classified as crimes against humanity (as some commentators have argued). The final decision would fall in each case to the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court, which would thus become the absolute arbiters of the future development of diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and a sizeable group of states. If this were to happen, the whole relationship between Germany and its eastern neighbours would be put in jeopardy.
Another that they do not have jurisdiction to decide claims relating to acts occurring before the entry into force of the Convention for the defendant state, though in this connection they distinguish between 'instantaneous acts with lasting effects', which fall outside their competence, and 'violations with a continuing character', which, conversely, fall within it. 47 Confiscation obviously comes within the former category of acts. The proposal to override the non-retroactivity of the Convention for serious violations of human rights has not met with a favourable response. The precedent set by the International Court of Justice in its judgment of 11 July 1996 regarding the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 48 does not appear to lend itself easily to interpretation by analogy in different contexts. Thus the Republic of Czechoslovakia, and thereafter by succession the Czech and Slovak Republics, became subject to the Convention as from 18 March 1992.
Secondly, as regards Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which concerns property rights, the consistent jurisprudence of both the former Commission and the Court requires the applicant to prove the existence of his or her 'substantive interest'. The Convention organs have consistently excluded from the concept of 'possessions' property over which there is merely a prospect of ownership, where actual ownership has not been capable of being effectively enjoyed for a long period. 49 For example, in 1975 the Commission made a decision of inadmissibility of an application by a German citizen of Sudetenland origin, who alleged that the conclusion of the Treaty of Prague of 11 December 1973 by the Federal Republic of Germany was contrary to the Convention.
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The same decision was reached by the Commission on 4 March 1996, dismissing an application by two Slovak citizens against Slovakia 51 for the recovery of assets confiscated in 1956 and 1973 in consequence of convictions for an unauthorized departure from and a refusal to re-enter the territory of the Slovak Republic. The two applicants had been judicially rehabilitated in 1990, and the effects of the prior As happened in the Czech Republic, whose Constitutional Court, on 11 July 1994, declared unconstitutional Article 3 of Law No. 87 of 1991, in that it required permanent residence; see Mancini, 'Restituzione e principio di non discriminazione dinanzi al Comitato dei diritti dell' uomo e alla Commissione europea dei diritti dell' uomo: il caso dell' ex-Cecoslovacchia', 35 Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (1999) 223, at 229. Contra Blumenwitz, supra note 10, at 38, for whom 'aus der allgemeinen Gleichheitssatz sowie aus dem Diskriminierungsverbot lassen sich jedoch Gesichtspunkte ableiten, die eine grundsätzliche Gleichbehandlung der Opfer des Stalinismus und der des Tschechoslowakismus [sic!] gebieten'. judgments were declared to be null ex tunc. The applicants were, however, unable to recover their assets since Law No. 87 of 1991 on the restitution of property confiscated by the Communist regime between 25 February 1948 and 1 January 1990 makes restitution conditional on citizenship of the then Federal Republic of Czechoslovakia and residence in the national territory, this latter requirement not being satisfied by the applicants. The Commission noted that, at the time of their judicial rehabilitation, the two applicants could not yet be deemed to be the owners, in the absence of the legislative regulation for this purpose to which the 1990 Law on judicial rehabilitation referred, and that from the time of entry into force of Law No. 87 of 1991 it was no longer possible to recognize a legitimate expectation of the applicants to recover possession of the assets, given their failure to satisfy the residency requirement. In the Commission's view, even the contingency of a referral by a municipal court to the Slovak Constitutional Court 52 would not of itself be sufficient to confer on the applicants the right to make a claim regarding their 'possessions' under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
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The severity of this decision by the European Commission has caused some puzzlement, 54 especially if the decision is compared to decisions of the United Nations' Civil and Political Rights Committee. In two cases, in 1995 and 1996, the Committee allowed applications respectively from a Czech citizen who could not have recourse to the provisions of Law No. 87 of 1991 because of his failure to fulfil the requirement of residence in the territory of the Czech Republic, 55 and from an Australian citizen of Czech origin, who could not have recourse to the same Law, because of his failure to fulfil the citizenship requirement. 56 In both cases, the Committee reached the conclusion that the requirements of citizenship and permanent residence imposed by Article 3 of Law No. 87 of 1991 violated the general principle of non-discrimination laid down by Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. One should not, however, exaggerate the importance of these two rulings for the question of confiscations of German property after the Second World War. 57 In fact, the following year, the same Committee declared the application of a Sudeten German against the Republic of Czechoslovakia, alleging breach of 
A The ECHR and the Right of Access to Justice
In addition to the political aspects of the case, the legal task with which the Court was confronted was also very difficult. Can a state by subsequent treaty remove the right of access to justice, and, if so, for what purpose? This question has implications well beyond the case under discussion, and touches upon such difficult issues as the succession in time of different norms, the removal by a state of the rights of its citizens, the exercise of diplomatic protection, and their relationship with treaties dealing with the protection of human rights. This is not an entirely novel issue, and indeed came before the Commission 44 years ago in relation to the same Settlement Convention under discussion here. That case dealt with the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Germany of the establishment of a Supreme Court of Restitutions with jurisdiction under Part III of the Convention to hear final appeals relating to claims for the restitution of assets belonging to citizens of the Allied Powers and transported to Germany during the war. 60 The Commission declared the application inadmissible, observing inter alia that 'neither the Settlement Convention nor the Charter annexed thereto contained any provision which was either expressly or implicitly inconsistent with the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights'.
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Considering the dynamic methods its organs adopt in interpreting the Convention as a living instrument, 62 there was a good chance that the Court could have revised its earlier decision, especially in view of the fact that since then the right of access to justice has not only been recognized as a right protected by the Convention, but has also been defined by the Court as 'one of the universally recognized fundamental principles of law'. Ibid., at para. 63.
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Ibid., at para. 68. This aspect is criticized by Pustorino, 'Immunità giurisdizionale delle organizzazioni internazionali e tutela dei diritti fondamentali: le sentenze della Corte europea nei casi Waite e Kennedy e Beer e Regan', 83 Rivista di diritto internazionale (2000) 132, at 147, who observes that the Court did not pay sufficient attention to the so-called criterion of 'equivalent protection', which the author considers to be the crucial test as to whether or not to recognize the immunity of international organizations in labour To understand the significance of this issue, some preliminary remarks on the scope of Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights are in order. A 'right of access to justice' is not specifically mentioned in the Article, but, starting from the judgment in the Golder case in 1975, the European Court has considered it to be an implied prerequisite for the fulfilment of the right, expressed in the Article, to a 'fair and public hearing'. 64 In Golder, the Court had not had to deal with issues of particular difficulty: the case concerned an impediment placed by the UK Government on a prisoner hindering him from consulting a lawyer with a view to suing for defamation. The subsequent case law of the Court has, however, established some general principles on the matter. First, the right of access to justice obviously presupposes a substantive right recognized by the legal order of the state in question, and which can normally be exercised before the courts. 65 Secondly, for the purposes of Article 6(1), a distinction between immunity from jurisdiction and an impediment to proceeding does not seem relevant, a fact explained by the greater attention accorded by Convention organs to matters of substance than to matters of form. 66 Thirdly, restrictions on access to justice are compatible with the Convention, where: (a) they pursue a legitimate aim; (b) they are proportionate to the aim pursued; and (c) they do not restrict the right to the point of extinguishing it. 67 The question of immunity from jurisdiction of international organizations is one that recently came before the European Court, giving it occasion to reassert the limits stated above. In the two (coincidental) judgments pronounced on 18 February 1999 in the cases of Waite and Kennedy v. Germany and Beer and Regan v. Germany, 68 a Grand Chamber of the Court held unanimously that the granting of immunity from jurisdiction to international organizations (in the case in point the European Space Agency) on the basis of constituent agreements or supplementary agreements, has for some time constituted a practice designed to ensure the proper functioning of such organizations and therefore pursues a legitimate aim. 69 As for the proportionality requirement, the Court asked itself whether the applicants had 'reasonable alternative means' available to protect effectively their rights under the Convention, and found on the facts that they had. Waite and Kennedy, supra note 68, Judgment, at para. 67. The Court's two judgments confounded the many commentators who had until then pointed out that, in the case of a conflict between applying the rule on immunity from jurisdiction and risking a denial of justice, the European Court would have had to sacrifice the former in order to guard against the latter.
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Indeed, in a central passage from the judgments, the Court went so far as to affirm that, since states establish international organizations and grant them immunity, the protection of fundamental rights may consequently be affected. However, the Court went on to state that it would be incompatible with the purpose and objective of the Convention if the contracting states were thereby absolved from all responsibility under the Convention in the sphere of the activity under review.
72 Therefore, while not wishing to prejudice its future decisions, the Court rejected the general supremacy of Convention norms over other international norms, and omitted to clarify whether the latter covers only rules of customary international law or treaty law as well. It is easy to understand the Court's reticence on this point, if one bears in mind the ongoing doctrinal debate as to whether rules on immunity from jurisdiction of 73 On this question, see Pustorino, supra note 70, at 141, with further bibliographical references. international organizations are customary or exclusively conventional in nature. 73 One argument in favour of the view that the Court actually wanted to refer to general rules of international law, or at least to the specific subject of immunity from jurisdiction, could perhaps be evinced from a comparison with the judgment of the same date in the case of Matthews v. United Kingdom. In that case, the Court was called upon to decide whether the United Kingdom could be held responsible for not having permitted citizens of Gibraltar to participate in elections to the European Parliament, in conformity with European Community acts; the Court stated in clear terms that the Convention does not preclude the transfer of competences to international organizations, provided the rights guaranteed by the Convention continue to be secured. 75 Recognizing ESA's immunity on the basis of a norm of the convention establishing the ESA would entail calling into question the assertion repeatedly made by the Commission that ECHR norms always prevail over subsequent treaty obligations of state parties.
In the Liechtenstein judgment of 12 July 2001, the Court unanimously held that there had been no violation of Article 6(1) of the Convention. 76 It found that the limitation on the right of access to a court imposed by Article 3 of Part VI of the Settlement Convention was legitimate, because: (a) it pursued a legitimate aim, namely, the 'public interest in regaining sovereignty and unifying Germany'; and, for that reason (b) it did not appear disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. 77 The Court found itself in a more difficult position in verifying the third condition, namely, the non-impairment of the very essence of the applicant's right. Here the Court attached 'particular significance' to the fact that the painting was expropriated as part of the Prince's 'agricultural property' under Benes Decree No. 12. If it is true, as was claimed by the defendant government, that the exclusion of German jurisdiction did not affect the great majority of expropriation cases under Decree No. 12, in which the property had remained on Czechoslovak territory, the present case was clearly one 78 Ibid., at para. 68.
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Ibid., at para. 66.
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Ibid., at para. 69. This aspect has been rightly criticized in the concurring opinions of Judges Ress and Zupancic, and in that of Judge Costa. According to the first two Judges, Article 3 of Part VI of the Settlement Convention infringes the 'very essence' of the right to access to courts, but it is, exceptionally, justified in the present case as being a kind of force majeure for the Federal Republic of Germany, in order to regain the full authority of a sovereign state (p. 32 of the electronic version of the judgment). For Judge Costa also, it was undeniable that the Settlement Convention impaired the 'very essence' of the right, but he preferred to resolve the matter by finding that Article 6 was inapplicable as such, because the applicant did not have a recognized complaint under German domestic law (p. 35 of the electronic version of the judgment). 81 Judgment, at para. 54. of the many possible exceptions. The fact that the link between the factual basis of the applicant's claim and German jurisdiction was only fortuitous -having been brought about by a Czech loan to the municipality of Cologne -is not as decisive as the Court wants it to be. 78 Neither is the Court's second argument -that the 'genuine forum' for the settlement of disputes in respect of those expropriation measures was the courts of the Czech or of the Slovak Republic -decisive. 79 Eventually, the Court reached the conclusion that the third condition was satisfied, by rather clumsily drawing on the existence of the other two conditions.

B The ECHR and Subsequent Treaties
More significantly, there is another essential point, about which the Court's reasoning conveys an impression of evasion. As the Court recognizes, the Settlement Convention was one of a series of agreements signed by the Federal Republic of Germany, together with France, the United Kingdom and the United States in 1952, and amended in 1954. The Court observes at the outset that the Federal Republic of Germany, when ratifying the ECHR on 5 December 1952, 'was still an occupied country' and that this 'situation prevailed when the Convention entered into force on 3 September 1953'.
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What the Court glossed over was the well-known fact that the 1952 Bonn Treaties never entered into force because of their rejection by the French National Assembly, and that therefore the 1954 Treaty was in all respects a treaty subsequent to the ECHR.
Although the Court tries not to put too much stress on it, there is an evident link in its reasoning between the question of the timeframe of ECHR norms in relation to other international treaty norms, and the question of the admissibility of limitations on the right of access to justice imposed for a legitimate aim. In other words, it is a matter of assessing whether the legitimate aims that permit restrictions to Article 6(1) include the need to perform certain subsequent treaty obligations. The question is doubly difficult, on the one hand owing to the uncertainty over whether the ECHR should be considered lex specialis or lex generalis, and, on the other hand, owing to its particular character, that is to say, the erga omnes character of its norms. Regarding the first question, 82 it is worth stressing again that the Commission has often affirmed the principle of the supremacy of ECHR norms over every other subsequent treaty obligation contracted by member states either with each other or with third states. 83 However, it was not entirely clear from the decisions of the Commission how it arrived at this conclusion. The Commission's fundamental approach is contained in its celebrated decision in the so-called Pfunders case, in which it affirmed that the obligations undertaken by the contracting parties were 'essentially of an objective character'. 84 However, the Commission did not explain the basis of the special nature of the Convention, nor its purpose of protecting the fundamental rights of individuals, the lack of material reciprocity between the contracting parties, or the fact that the ECHR established 'a common public order of the free democracies of Europe', or all of these aspects taken together.
It is noteworthy, however, that the Court is by contrast more prudent in its decisions than the Commission. 85 The Court has tried up till now to avoid having to acknowledge a direct conflict between a Convention norm and a norm contained in a later treaty, in particular where the treaty was concluded with a third state. The most instructive case appears to be the judgment in Soering v. United Kingdom, 86 in which the Court correlated the prohibition against inhuman and degrading treatment laid down in Article 3 with the risk that the application of the United Kingdom-United States Extradition Treaty of 1972 would lead to exposing the applicant to the 'death row syndrome'. After the Court recalled the 'beneficent purpose' that an extradition agreement in itself possesses, and invoked the principle by which Convention norms This opinion is shared by Geck, supra note 89, at 59, and Bernhardt, in G. Ress and T. Stein (eds), Der diplomatische Schutz im Völker-und Europarecht (1996) 25. According to the latter author, the erga omnes nature of human rights treaties would as a rule exclude all 'Dispositionsmöglichkeiten des Heimatstaates'. For a contrary view and with specific reference to the European Convention, see the reply of Doehring in the same symposium; and Ress, 'Diplomatischer Schutz und völkerrechtliche Verträge', in G. Ress and T. Stein (eds), Der diplomatische Schutz im Völker-und Europarecht (1996) 83, at 95, according to whom the Convention's procedures have precedence over countermeasures but might yield to the exercise of diplomatic protection, for instance through the conclusion of an 'amicable settlement'. cannot be imposed on third states through the intervention of states parties, 87 it nonetheless decided that a violation of Article 3 of the Convention would occur if the extradition went ahead. Strictly speaking, the Court's judgment in this case led to no derogation from the later bilateral treaty, because that treaty itself provided the possibility for the United Kingdom to impose conditions on the extradition. Anyway, as observers have rightly noted, even a derogation would have been justified by reason of the risk of a serious violation of what is considered a norm of 'jus cogens of human rights'.
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It would appear more fruitful to examine closely the second aspect mentioned above, that is, the erga omnes character of the obligations enshrined in the Convention. The peculiar character of the Convention, defined as 'altruistic' or 'individualistic', 89 was readily highlighted by Commission decisions. 90 Important consequences flow from this characteristic of the Convention, which is further reinforced by the institutionalization of the control mechanisms. The first consequence is that a state party which evades the duties incumbent on it would find itself exposed to the possibility of complaints being lodged against it by the other states parties as well as by individuals suffering harm. Another consequence that some commentators believe can be drawn from the erga omnes nature of the Convention's obligations seems less certain, namely, the impossibility for a contracting state to exercise diplomatic protection in favour of its citizens as against another contracting state.
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The relationship between human rights treaties and diplomatic protection has not received particular attention in the jurisprudence until now. There is a general tendency to consider the latter to be superseded by the former, whenever the human rights instrument provides for the individual's direct access to the control mechanisms instituted by the treaty. Here again the concept of the speciality of human rights treaties appears. As was recently pointed out by Crawford in his reports to the ILC on state responsibility, what is special about human rights obligations is their formulation in terms of rights of individuals, whereas by contrast the rules relating to diplomatic protection are framed as involving rights of states. 92 It is evident that the change in terminology must have some legal significance, but it is precisely here that the main difficulties arise.
In a recent article on the speciality of human rights treaties in international law, Craven infers from the Commission's approach in the Pfunders case that, because of a lack of reciprocity, the inter-state petition mechanism envisaged by Article 33 of the Convention should be regarded rather as a form of actio popularis than as a mechanism designed for dispute resolution. 93 In Craven's words, by exercising their right of petition, states are 'serving something in the nature of a public function', in order to 'further the ends of the regime as an institution embodying collective values'. Though, as the same author concedes, the Court did not go as far as the Commission in its judgment in the case of Ireland v. United Kingdom, in which it confined itself to stressing the possibility of a 'collective enforcement' of the objective obligations enshrined in the Convention, created by the treaty 'over and above a network of mutual bilateral undertakings'. 94 The cautious wording of the Court reinforces the position of those authors, like Simma, who, by adhering to a concept of legal reciprocity, arrive at the conclusion that human rights treaties do not differ on a normative level from other treaties, in that they 'set forth reciprocal rights and obligations in precisely the same way'. 95 In the case law of the Commission, there are decisions which contain statements about the lack of a right to diplomatic protection in the Convention, statements made in relation to cases of violation of rights committed by third states, such as the Soviet Union or Morocco, or by states parties, such as Turkey (in the latter case, prior to that country's acceptance of direct individual petition). 96 It is clear, though, that in such cases the problems are different from those that would be posed if the individual were to submit a petition against his or her own state, complaining of a deprivation of a right guaranteed by the Convention on account of a bad exercise of diplomatic protection. Even admitting the improbability of such a case, since it is likely that the individual would have recourse to the Convention instruments whenever possible before applying to his or her own government, nevertheless the possibility cannot be ruled out that the state of the applicant's citizenship might use diplomatic protection without consulting the individual concerned, especially where disputes concerning a large number of individuals are involved. 97 Article 55 of the Convention does not seem to provide a solution in such a case; this Article binds states parties not to submit a dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of the European Convention to a means of settlement other than those provided for in the Convention itself. In effect, as the text of the norm clearly shows, the prohibition only applies to conventional means of settlement that already exist and are directly actionable by way of petition;
98 it does not seem to apply to methods under general international law, such as diplomatic protection. Even if this is so from a strict legal point of view, nevertheless one has to take into account the practice of the ECHR organs, especially the Commission, in not availing themselves of general international law rules which could lead to a restrictive interpretation of the Convention.
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In the only instance in which the Commission was required to interpret Article 55, 100 namely, in its decision of 28 June 1996 on the admissibility of the claim submitted by Cyprus against Turkey, it affirmed that, as a rule, the Convention institutions enjoy 'the monopoly . . . for deciding disputes arising out of the interpretation and application of the Convention', and that alternative means of disputes settlement could apply only in 'exceptional circumstances'. 100 However, one looks in vain in the Commission's decision for a legal basis for their decision other than the well-known and axiomatic principle of the Convention's supremacy. Indeed, it would be difficult to sustain the Commission's position by reference to the different entitlement to the right claimed -on the one hand by the individual before the international organ, and on the other hand by the state of citizenship against the state responsible. The rationale behind conventional norms that grant individuals international standing to bring actions is to provide those individuals with a means of protection to remedy possible breaches of their rights. Obviously, the usefulness of such a means is manifest where it is the state of citizenship that has committed the breach, since practice shows that it is very rare for there to be an inter-state claim. In the case of a violation committed by another state, however, the rationale behind the protective norm is less obvious, since the claim can be settled through other mechanisms of general international law, such as the exercise of diplomatic protection. While, at a practical level, various mechanisms can be established to avoid the risk of double recovery, the picture is more complex for cases where the individual is faced with a definitive settlement of the dispute at the international level through the waiver of the claim by his or her state of citizenship, a course which for international law still represents under certain circumstances a legitimate outcome of an exercise of diplomatic protection.
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It can be inferred from practice that waiver by a state can be done in two ways: either waiver of the state's own claim, but preserving the possibility of individual claims on the part of the state's citizens; or waiver in the name of the state and also in the name of its citizens, in which case a specific undertaking is sometimes given not to permit recourse to domestic complaints procedures. 102 There is no doubt as to the lawfulness of these various types of waiver in general international law, insofar as the waiver does not contravene peremptory international norms. 103 The International Law Commission recently had occasion to examine the issues arising from a state's waiver of claim, when at its 52nd session in 2000 it tackled various questions relating to the implementation of international responsibility under its codification project. The provisionally adopted Article 46 (now Article 45) 104 provided that the responsibility of a state may not be invoked, inter alia, if the injured state has 'validly waived the claim in an unequivocal manner'. This wording echoed the formulation proposed by Special Rapporteur Crawford in his third report. Unfortunately, the relevant passage in the report is not very illuminating on the precise meaning to be attributed to the adverb 'validly', which plays an essential role in the Article's scope. The Special Rapporteur draws a parallel with the case where the consent of the party entitled to make a claim is a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, and gives examples relating to invalid consent of state representatives; otherwise, he confines himself to leaving 'to the general law the question of what amounts to a valid waiver in the circumstances'.
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The relevance for our purpose of the ILC's Draft Articles on State Responsibility is somewhat lessened by the wording of Article 33(2), which expressly states that Part Two of the Draft Articles 'is without prejudice to any right, arising from the international law responsibility of a State, which accrues directly to any person or entity other than a State', 106 thus effectively limiting the scope of the entire Part Two to issues of inter-state responsibility. Indeed, on a closer look, one can question whether the topic of international responsibility is the proper context for dealing with the question of the consequences that a state's disposition has on its citizens' rights. Interestingly, the Special Rapporteur had included settlements alongside waiver as a ground for the loss of the right to invoke responsibility. 107 The ILC, however, decided to delete the reference to settlement, considering it as out of place in the framework of the invocation and implementation of responsibility. As the Chairman of the Drafting Committee at the 52nd session, Gaja, rightly pointed at, when a dispute is settled, there is an agreement which modifies the legal situation and extinguishes the dispute. 108 It is precisely that agreement -which is outside the scope of international responsibility and therefore outside the scope of Article 33(2) -which might produce lasting adverse effects on the legal position of the individual with regard to his or her claim.
The ILC will shortly have the opportunity to consider the question of the consequences of waivers in greater depth as part of the project of codification regarding diplomatic protection. This specific matter should be the subject of a forthcoming report by Special Rapporteur Dugard, 109 but an outline of the Special Rapporteur's views is already contained in his first report. To assist the progressive development of international law, Dugard proposed establishing a state's obligation of diplomatic protection in the case of a serious violation of a norm of jus cogens committed by another state, thus moving away from the dominant legal theory in this respect, according to which the exercise of diplomatic protection constitutes a right, but not an obligation, of the state. In the Special Rapporteur's view, this obligation would be subject to certain limits, such as where fulfilling the duty might 'seriously endanger the overriding interests of the state and/or its people'. 110 Although, for various reasons, the draft of the Article did not meet with the necessary support of the ILC, 111 its underlying rationale may be perfectly acceptable, and lend itself to being applied also to the different case of waiver. If the imperative of defending the overriding interests of the nation is such as to prevent a state even from intervening the sovereign rights belonging to a state far outweighed its interest in seeking to support the alleged rights claimed by a number of its citizens, and the waiver was therefore fully justified. The words of the Commission pronounced 44 years ago in the decision cited above are significant in this regard: in negotiating the terms of the Treaty of Bonn/Paris of 1952/1954, it was not a question of the Federal Republic consenting to limitations on a sovereignty it already possessed, but rather of first obtaining a transfer of sovereignty to itself. In the light of this consideration, the Commission questioned whether there was any reason to apply to the case in hand the principle that treaties entered into at a later date should be compatible with Convention norms. 116 In the Liechtenstein judgment, the Court reached the same conclusion, although understandably without wishing to make a general statement on this delicate issue. Therefore the Court limited itself to noting the 'unique circumstances' of the particular status of Germany under public international law after the Second World War, which partly endured until the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany of 12 September 1990 entered into force. The Court added that, in the negotiations with the three Allied Powers, the Federal Republic of Germany 'had to accept' that the specific limitation on its jurisdiction dictated by Article 3 of Part VI of the Settlement Convention was not abolished. 117 The emphasis laid by the Court on the constraints on the German negotiating position seems exaggerated and even dangerous, particularly if one is aware of the view of some German authors who see the Settlement Convention as an unequal treaty. Consequently, they seek to oppose the entrenchment of what they consider to be the lower status of Germany, in particular by casting doubt on the constitutionality of the treaty in its form consequent on the exchange of notes of 27-28 September 1990. 118 These authors contend that, because the exchange of notes maintained in force rules that would otherwise have been extinguished by virtue of Article 7 of the Treaty of Moscow of 12 September 1990, a new agreement in fact came into existence, which ought to have been approved by the federal Parliament under Article 29(2) of the Grundgesetz.
The German Constitutional Court had the opportunity to refute this in its order of 28 January 1998 in the Liechtenstein case. In line with its previous case law on the impossibility of bringing claims challenging confiscatory measures effected from 1945 to 1949 in the Soviet-occupied zone, 119 the Court stressed that the government's commitment to prohibiting legal actions relating to events stemming from the occupation regime cannot be assessed under Article 14 of the Grundgesetz (which 120 The grounds for the Prince of Liechtenstein's application alleging violation of the right to a fair hearing under Article 6(1) of the European Convention refer precisely to this part of the Constitutional Court's order. The Court is accused of basing its decision on facts about the existence of which the applicant had not previously been notified, i.e. the 'new legal views of the Federal Republic and of the three Western Powers'. The European Court had no difficulty in finding that considerations similar to those of the Constitutional Court had already been dealt with by the Appeal Court of Cologne, and that they were drawn in any case from a logical and systematic interpretation of international negotiations and the content of international agreements, i.e. 'circumstances which had been known to the applicant and which had been the subject of argument in court' (Judgment, para. 75 concerns respect for private property) because the Settlement Convention is directed at settling issues that arose before the entry into force of the Grundgesetz. The Court also rejected, on the merits, the argument that through the exchange of notes the German Government had renewed an undertaking that would otherwise have been discharged, noting that Article 7(1) of the Treaty of Moscow has the aim of extinguishing the agreements between the four Allied Powers, but not those freely made by the Federal Republic of Germany with the three Western Powers. As the Court was easily able to demonstrate, if Article 7 had had the purpose of making all the norms relating to the German occupation regime temporary independently of their origin, the German Government and the three Western Powers would have had no reason to indicate in their exchange of notes which of the norms of the Settlement Convention were to be considered discharged and which, on the other hand, were still in force. Shortly before the decision of the European Court, the Prince's lawyers conceived a new strategy: the claim would not only concern the human rights of the Prince, but also the sovereign rights of the state of Liechtenstein itself. Therefore, on 1 June 2001, an application was submitted by the Principality of Liechtenstein against the Federal Republic of Germany. Liechtenstein requests the Court to adjudge that Germany has incurred international legal responsibility and therefore is bound to make appropriate reparation to Liechtenstein because of its conduct with respect to Liechtenstein property since 1998. Liechtenstein alleges that, as a result of the Federal Constitutional Court's decision of 28 January 1998, on the one hand Germany is now treating as German assets which belonged to nationals of Liechtenstein, to their detriment and to the detriment of Liechtenstein itself, while on the other hand denying that it has any obligation towards Liechtenstein to compensate it. 121 In other words, Liechtenstein alleges that Germany is now, for whatever reason, wilfully taking advantage of Czechoslovakia's post-war seizures of Liechtenstein's property.
